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Abstract
The study constructs general motivation model of 
technology outsourcing of bilateral moral hazard and 
mainly analyzes impact that principal and agent’s output 
elasticity influence on sharing ratio and variable profit. 
The main conclusions are as following: Firstly, sharing 
ratio is determined by output elasticity, the side that 
owns bigger output elasticity will have higher sharing 
proportion from the output, especially when their output 
elasticity equal, sharing ratio is 0.5; secondly, respective 
variable profit also depends on output elasticity, the side 
that owns bigger output elasticity will have more variable 
profit.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Kodak Company outsourced their IT business 
to IBM, IT outsourcing has become more and more 
popular in the world: Firstly, IT outsourcing has held 
higher proportion in practical outsourcing market; 
secondly, IT outsourcing has got more attention from 
academic community. Some scholars pointed out that 
IT outsourcing can bring organization benefits, such as 
improving organizational performance (Gilley & Rasheed, 
2000), sustaining competitive advantage (Sadiq, 2011), 
increasing business efficiency (Agrawal & Haleem, 2013), 
stimulating innovation (Su, Levina, & Ross, 2016), etc.. 
However, some also believed IT outsourcing was evil and 
had many risks, such as can bring weakened management 
(Earl, 1996), huge intangible cost (Barthelemy, 2001), etc.. 
Whatever the relationship between IT outsourcing and 
organizational performance is, IT outsourcing has become 
one economic trend (Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009).
In the actual IT outsourcing market, there is adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems because of 
information asymmetry between the principal (the client) 
and the agent. According to principal-agent theory, to 
solve adverse selection and moral hazard only depends on 
effective contract design and incentive mechanism design 
(Shi & Wang, 2011; Song, Dan, & Zhang, 2011). 
Now the question is: Can the principal influence the 
output? In this paper, our answer is yes. Some literatures 
concluded that the success of outsourcing depended on 
mutual cooperation, trust, knowledge sharing, relationship 
quality (Wang & Shen, 2012; Song, Du, & Ai, 2013; 
Qi, & Chau, 2013), etc.. However, these conditions are 
determined by mutual efforts, namely the principal can 
affect output more or less. 
How mutual effort of the principal and the agent 
influences output under bilateral moral hazard? How to 
design incentive mechanism under bilateral moral hazard? 
Huang et al. (2011) studied how to make use of profit 
distribution mode to encourage the principal and the agent 
to tell the truth and invest more resources in outsourcing. 
Song et al. (2011) researched incentive mechanism of 
service outsourcing of bilateral moral hazard. Olmos 
(2011) researched the effectiveness of liner sharing 
contract to ensure food quality. Dai et al. (2014) applied 
team production model and Nash negotiation model to 
explore the optimal linear sharing contract of services 
outsourcing under bilateral moral hazard. The paper plans 
to construct general incentive model of bilateral moral 
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hazard and mainly discuss the incentive mechanism 
design of IT outsourcing basing on Holmstrom and 
Milgrom’s analysis method (Bengst & Paul, 1987) and 
principal-agent theory.
1 .  M E T H O D S  A N D  P R O B L E M S 
DESCRIPTION 
As literature mainly applied mathematical modeling to 
solve problems of incentive mechanism design, therefore 
the paper decides to apply mathematical modeling to do 
research.
Assumption 1: The effort level of the principal and the 
agent are e1, e2 respectively. Similar to the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the output function of outsourcing is 
π = e1
m e2
n + ε, m, n∈(0,1) and m, n represents respective 
output elasticity, measuring the extent that effort level 
contributes to the output. Variable ε measures external 
uncertainties that may impact the output and it symbolizes 
uncontrollable conditions in the process of outsourcing. 
ε∈N (0, σ2).
Assumption 2: Both sides have costs because efforts 
also need resource investment. The principal and the 
agent’s cost function are 0.5e1
2, 0.5e2
2 respectively. We can 
find that with the effort level increasing, the cost increases 
correspondingly. 
Assumption 3: After signing the contract, the principal 
will pay fixed cost α firstly, α is a constant. Then, both 
sides will determine revenue sharing ratio β according to 
final output, β∈(0,1). Namely, the payment mode is α+βπ. 
Sharing ratio β is also called residual claims. Obviously, 
the bigger the sharing ratio is, the more can get from the 
output. Meanwhile, both are risk neutral. Profit of the 
principal is Eπ1 = -α+(1 - β)e1
me2
n - 0.5e1
2, profit of the 
agent is Eπ2 = α+βe1
me2
n - 0.5e2
2.
On the basis of above assumptions, general incentive 
model of IT outsourcing of bilateral moral hazard can be 
constructed as following:
   Max-α + (1 - β)e1
me2
n - 0.5e1
2 , (1)
     α + βe1
me2
n - 0.5e2
2 ≥ ω -- ,  (2)
     e1, e2∈arg max Eπ1, Eπ2 . (3)
Formula (1) is the object function to pursue maximum 
profit of the principal; Formula (2) means profit of the agent 
is at least bigger than his reserved profit ω -- or opportunity 
cost ω-- , ω -- is a constant; Formula (3) is the motivation 
condition, it ensures maximum effort level of both sides.
2. MODELING ANALYSIS 
Calculating partial derivative of Formula (3), we can 
obtain:
     nβe1
me2
n-1-e2 = 0 . (4)
Combining Formula (2) and (1), adding Formula (2) to 
Formula (1), we can get total profits:
  Eπ1+Eπ2 = e1
me2
n - 0.5e1
2 - 0.5e2
2-ω .--  (5)
Calculating partial derivative of Formula (1), we 
can obtain:
  m (1 - β)e1
m-1e2
n- e1=0 . (6)
Solving simultaneity equations of Formula (4) and (6), 
we can get 
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Taking Formula (7) and (8) to Formula (5), we can get 
total profits:
 2 2
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Calculating maximal value of (9), namely calculating 
first-order derivative of β, we can get:
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n n n
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Formula (11) can be regarded as the condition that 
satisfies maximum total profits of both sides. As m, n∈(0, 
1), whether the value of (11) is positive or negative, it 
relies on (11) as follows:
 [n - 2nβ - 0.5mn + mn β - mβ2 + nβ2] . (11)
Proposition 1 Sharing proportion depends on the 
respective output elasticity. When the principal’s output 
elasticity is bigger than the agent’s, the sharing proportion 
of the principal is bigger than 0.5; vice versa. When their 
output elasticity equal, sharing proportion is 0.5, namely 
they each get one half outputs. 
Proof: Because proving it directly is very complex 
and difficult, the paper tries to solve it indirectly from 
relations between the roots and the coefficients of 
quadratic function. When m ≠ n, Formula (11) can be 
translated to:
 (n - m)β2 + (mn-2n)β + (n - 0.5mn) = 0 . (12)
Formula (12) can be translated to be quadratic function 
and define :
   
2
22 ( 2 )( ) ( )( ) ( 0.5 )
2 2 4( )
mn n mn nf n m n mn
n m n m
β β − −= − + + − −
− −
. 
(13)
If f (β) is quadratic function, (14) can be defined as the 
condition that f (β)=0 has real roots: 
  Δ = (mn - 2n)2 - 4(n - m)(n - 0.5mn) = mn(mn - 2m - 2n + 4). (14)
When mn - 2m - 2n + 4 > 0, f(β) = 0 have two different 
real roots, define them as β1, β2. If m < n, the symmetry 
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axis of f(β) function graph is  2 0
2 2
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, minimal 
value of f(β) is 
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Therefore, function graph of f(β) is similarly as figure 
1 shows. In Figure 1, we can find B(β1,0), C(β2,0) are 
crossover points that f(β) crosses with X axis. Actually 
B(β1,0), C(β2,0) are roots of f(β) = 0. In the Figure 1 
we can see 0.5 < β1 < 1 < β2, β∈(0,1), therefore only 
β1 is efficient solution of f(β) = 0.Therefore, 0.5 < β 
< 1. Likewise, if n < m, we can prove the function 
graph of f(β) is shown as Figure 2. In Figure 2, we 
can find β1 < 0 < β2 < 0.5 < 1, β∈(0,1)，therefore 
only β2 is efficient solution of f ( β ) = 0. Therefore, 
0 < β < 0.5.
  
                           Figure 1                  Figure 2
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Proposition 2 Both sides’ variable profit is determined 
by respective output elasticity, namely: 
Without considering α, when the principal’s output 
elasticity is bigger, he can get more variable profit; vice 
versa; when their output elasticity equal, their variable 
profits equal.
Proof: From the above, we can know each profit is
    Eπ1 = -α + (1 - β)e1
me2
n - 0.5e1
2, Eπ2 
             = α + βe1
me2
n - 0.5e2
2. 
If we do not take fixed payment α into consideration, 
define Formula (16) as the difference of Eπ1, Eπ2 (do not 
consider α):
  [(1 - β)e1
me2
n - 0.5e1
2] - [βe1
me2
n - 0.5e2
2] = [(1 - 2β)e1
me2
n + 0.5(e2
2 - e1
2)] . (15)
After simplified calculation, we can get:
 22 2 2(1 ) [ ( - 4) 2 ]
m
m n
m n n
m n m n m nm n m n mβ β β− −− − − − − −− + + − . (16)
m,n∈(0,1), β∈(0,1),we can conclude: Whether the 
value of Formula (16) is positive or negative, it depends 
on β(m + n - 4) + 2 - m.
If n < m < 1, 0 < m + n < 2, then -4 < m + n < -2; 
according to proposition 1，0 < β < 0.5, then -2 < β(m + n 
- 4) < -1; as 1 < 2 - m < 2, β(m + n - 4) + 2 - m>0.
Likewise, we can prove if
m < n, β(m + n - 4) + 2 - m<0.m = n, β(m + n - 4) + 2 - m = 0.
CONCLUSION
The paper constructs general incentive model of IT 
outsourcing of bilateral moral hazard basing on principal-
agent theory and explores the impact that respective output 
elasticity influences the sharing proportion and their 
variable profit. The conclusions are mainly as following. 
Firstly, sharing ratio is determined by respective output 
elasticity. The side that has bigger output elasticity will 
have more than 0.5 sharing proportion, namely he can ask 
more residual claim from the final output compared with 
the other side. Secondly, if do not consider α, both sides’ 
variable profit are also determined by output elasticity: 
The side that has bigger output elasticity will have more 
variable profit. Thirdly, output elasticity is so important 
that it can impact sharing ratio and respective profit 
theoretically.
The conclusions are beneficial to both theory research 
and practitioner of IT outsourcing. However, the paper 
also needs improvement in the future research such as 
taking the principal and the agent’s risk preference into 
consideration. This is the direction of future research.
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